The TWZ Newsletter
Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have proven to have an air defense arsenal that presents real threats, as evidenced by a still-growing number of shootdowns of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones. Still, many details about the scale and scope of Houthis’ air defense capabilities continue to be obscure and ambiguous. The U.S. military’s use of an increasing variety of air-launched stand-off munitions against targets in Yemen, as well as the employment of B-2 stealth bombers, also point to the danger posed to aircraft being even higher than is widely appreciated. So what actually are the Houthis’ air defense capabilities? That’s a clear question with at best a murky answer, but here is what we know.
The Houthi Surface-To-Air Missile Arsenal And MQ-9 Losses
Questions about the full extent of Houthi air defense capabilities have been growing for months now as the Yemeni militants have been able to down an alarming number of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones.
A U.S. defense official told TWZ yesterday that Yemeni militants have or are suspected to have brought down six MQ-9s since March 15. Fox News reported today that U.S. officials have acknowledged the loss of another Reaper, the seventh one since the beginning of last month. Back in March, an unnamed U.S. defense official told Stars and Stripes that the Houthis had downed 12 Reapers since October 2023.
— Jennifer Griffin (@JenGriffinFNC) April 23, 2025DAY 40 of US CENTCOM bombing the Houthis.
NEW – Fox Exclusive: Another U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone was shot down by the Houthis in Yemen on Tuesday, two U.S. officials tell Fox News. This is the 7th MQ-9 Reaper drone shot down by the Houthis since March 3rd and under the Trump…
The Houthis themselves have claimed the destruction of at least 22 Reapers since October 2023, including the one just yesterday, but this cannot be readily verified independently. That tally does not include a number of drones belonging to the United States and other countries that the Yemeni militants shot down prior to October 2023.
Yemeni Houthis (Ansar-Allah group) claim that they have shot down yet another (26th) US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone today (April 22, 2025) in the Al-Hajjah governate.
— Mehdi H. (@mhmiranusa) April 22, 2025
This is the 7th Reaper shot this April (22nd in the recent war after Oct 7, 2023). pic.twitter.com/chAiBnx4JZ
The U.S. military has pushed back against Houthi claims about MQ-9 shoot-downs in the past, while also acknowledging an unspecified number of losses. It is also possible that some number of Reapers have gone down in and around Yemen in recent months due to accidents, which are not unheard of for the type, but this could not account for the bulk of the losses. Who specifically the lost MQ-9s belong to is also unclear, with the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps being current operators of the drones. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also flies Reapers.
The MQ-9 losses come amid a renewed and expanded aerial offensive against Houthi targets in Yemen that President Donald Trump’s administration launched in March. The U.S. military has been actively engaged against the Iranian-backed militants since October 2023. That month, the Yemeni militants launched a campaign against maritime traffic in and around the Red Sea, as well as attacks on Israel, ostensibly in response to that country’s intervention into the Gaza Strip. The Israeli operations had, in turn, followed large-scale terrorist attacks launched from Gaza on Oct. 7, 2023.
It is also worth noting here that the Houthis routinely boast that the vast bulk of their overall missile arsenal, along with their drones, is domestically developed and produced. Iran’s involvement is indisputable, but Yemeni militants are capable, at least to a degree, of developing, producing, and/or assembling missiles and other weapon systems within the country.
“We’ve been surprised at times with some of the things that we see them do, and it makes us scratch our head a little bit,” a senior U.S. defense official told TWZ and other outlets earlier this year about the Houthis, adding that the group is “not super technologically advanced, but we do think they’re pretty innovative.”
“There’s a good bit right now we don’t know about the Houthis.”
Surface-To-Air Missiles From Iran
Among the most modern and capable surface-to-air missiles the Houthis are currently understood to have in service are the Barq-1 and Barq-2, which were publicly unveiled in September 2023.
The Yemeni militants claim the Barq-1 and Barq-2 have maximum ranges of around 31 miles (50 kilometers) and close to 43.5 miles (70 kilometers), and can engage targets at altitudes up to some 49,212 feet (15 kilometers) and 65,616 feet (20 kilometers), respectively. There does not appear to be any independent confirmation of these figures.
#Yemen’s #Houthis may have downed the #US ?? MQ-9 drone with a modified SA-6's 3M9M4 surface-to-air missile, sourced from Republican Guard arsenal, specifically the Barq-1 and Barq-2 variants, with an approximate range of 70 kilometers and an altitude capability of 20 kilometers pic.twitter.com/7KJHg3yRJw
— Basha باشا (@BashaReport) November 8, 2023
Note entirely certain, but it does look a lot like a Houthi Barq 2 surface-to-air missile (Iranian Ta'er) to me. Note the 90-degree angle at the rear of the lateral wings, the wing attachment, and the clamps used to attach the cable raceway. https://t.co/T2cHk52i9m pic.twitter.com/EXBRRgRWYi
— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) March 22, 2024
Experts and observers have generally assessed that the Barq-1 and Barq-2 are at least based on Iran’s Taer family of medium-range radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. The Taer series missiles are themselves at least heavily influenced by Soviet-era and subsequent Russian-made interceptors for the 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) and the 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) air defense systems, if not direct copies or clones of them.
How the Houthis employ Barq-1 and Barq-2 is not entirely clear, but Taer missiles in Iranian service are fired from various wheeled launchers, some of which have their own integrated fire control radars. Some of Iran’s air defense systems capable of firing Taer variants also reportedly have electro-optical and/or infrared cameras to aid in target acquisition, identification, and tracking. Off-board radars can also be used to spot and track targets, and help cue Taer missiles to them.
In 2018, U.S. and Saudi Arabian authorities also said that components for Iranian Sayyad-2C surface-to-air missiles had been intercepted on their way to Yemen. However, to date, there is no clear evidence of these missiles being in Houthi service.
“While we have seen a Sayyad-2 interdicted by the Saudis on its way to Yemen and the Sayyad-2 is known to be in service with other pro-Iranian non-state actors (Lebanese Hezbollah), we have not seen any evidence for it being actively deployed by the Houthis. This stands in contrast to missiles of the Taer series,” Fabin Hinz, a research fellow for defence and military analysis at International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank in the United Kingdom, told TWZ. “It is unclear whether the Sayyad-2 is operated by the Houthis and simply has not shown up, or whether the Iranians changed their plans.”
Saudi officials did previously release what they said were images of a possible truck-based launcher for the Sayyad-2C, but these look instead to have shown one for firing Badr-1s. The Badr-1 is variously described as a heavy artillery rocket or a close-range ballistic missile (CRBM). CRBMs are defined as a subset of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges under 186 miles (300 kilometers).
Looking at this again, it seems a Saudi surveillance aircraft filmed the Houthis as they filmed the Badr-1 promotional video at Sanaa airport pic.twitter.com/dfeylyC2ea
— Jeremy Binnie (@JeremyBinnie) April 4, 2018
The baseline Sayyad-2 is derived, at least in part, from semi-active radar-homing American RIM-66 Standard Missiles supplied to Iran during the time of the Shah. The Long War Journal, part of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank in Washington, D.C., has previously estimated the missile to have a range of between around 50 and 93 miles (80 and 150 kilometers) and be able to reach targets at altitudes of between 20,000 and 30,000 feet. How the 2C variant differs from the initial version is unclear.
The fragment of the Iranian Sayyad-2C anti-aircraft missile on place of the Israeli strike in Najjarieh area, Lebanon. This is the first direct evidence, that Hezbollah has the Iranian SAM systems from the RaadTabas3rd Khordad family. Although there was little doubt about it pic.twitter.com/lQ1xxkI8SQ
— Yuri Lyamin (@imp_navigator) May 17, 2024
In Iranian service, Sayyad-2s are employed using a similar array of wheeled launchers, as well as radars and other sensors, as the Taer family. Some Iranian air defense systems, like the Sevom Khordad (3rd Khordad), can reportedly fire both types. Sevom Khordad was notably the system Iran said it used to shoot down a U.S. Navy RQ-4A Broad Area Maritime Surveillance-Demonstrator (BAMS-D) flying over the Gulf of Oman in 2019.
In addition, the Houthis have previously claimed to have developed a surface-to-air derivative of the Badr-1P, a precision-guided version of the aforementioned Badr-1. Other details about the weapon, referred to variously as the Maraj or Miraj, are scant.
“The Miraj bears a strong resemblance to several of the Houthis’ shorter-range, precision-guided surface-to-surface missiles,” but “it remains unclear whether the system is operational, and if so, how effective it is.” IISS’ Hinz also told TWZ.
Artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are not typically designed with the kinds of maneuvering required for an effective anti-air weapon in mind. Whether or not Maraj/Miraj might leverage a guidance system and other components from Iranian-supplied surface-to-air missiles is also unknown.
The Maraj/Miraj “may represent an effort to extend Iran’s proliferation model, enabling local missile production supplemented by externally sourced guidance components, from the surface-to-surface to the surface-to-air domain,” Hinz added.
A United Nations panel of experts previously assessed the baseline unguided Badr-1 to be a domestically produced weapon built “from steel tubing very likely sourced from the oil industry.”
Iranian Loitering SAMs
Of the Houthis’ known air defense capabilities, and one of the few that U.S. officials have confirmed to be in active combat use, a curious Iranian-supplied design, it has received the most public scrutiny. Most commonly referred to simply as the “358” and now sometimes as the SA-67, and powered by a small turbojet, this surface-to-air missile is generally described as a “loitering” design, though its exact capabilities remain unclear. Typical surface-to-air missiles use solid-fuel rocket motors for propulsion.
The 358, which the Yemeni militants also call the Saqr-1, first emerged publicly after the U.S. Navy seized components for the weapons after boarding a small vessel bound for Yemen in the Arabian Sea in 2019. Now confirmed to be in service with the Houthis, 358s have also been recovered from Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq and Lebanon.
The roughly nine-foot-long 358 has three sets of fins for maneuvering and stabilization in flight, one at the nose end, one at the tail end, and one along the middle of the missile’s cylindrical body.
The design shares various components, including a satellite navigation-assisted inertial navigation system guidance package, vertical gyroscope, and air data unit, with multiple kamikaze drone types that are in Iranian and Houthi inventories.
“The weapon flies in a figure-eight pattern and looks for targets,” The New York Times reported in 2020, citing unnamed U.S. military officials. “A dozen infrared lenses arranged in a ring around the missile are believed to be able to defeat heat-seeking countermeasures that coalition helicopters typically use.”
As TWZ subsequently wrote about this unusual anti-air weapon:
“However, it is not immediately clear how such a conclusion was made [by The New York Times‘ sources] or how such a setup would overcome countermeasures. If the two rows of sensors are redundant, but work on different wavelengths, this could help reduce the impact of one countermeasure type over another. It’s also possible that one row is made up of infrared sensors as part of the guidance systems and the other are laser proximity fuze sensors, like those on many traditional SAMs and air-to-air missiles. One other possibility is that the ‘collar’ array, or at least one row of those sensors, works to detect a potential target initially and then cues the primary sensor in the nose onto that target to discriminate it and execute an attack if warranted.”
“It is, of course, very possible that multiple versions of the 358 could exist now, including ones that leverage some form of passive homing and/or that can receive updates from offboard sensors. At least one known example, seen above, has a particularly prominent antenna on the back, which could provide for some level of basic semi-autonomous control.”
“Altogether, the viability of this concept remains an open question. The low speed of the missile already means it is not useful for engaging fast-moving combat jets in many scenarios and is better suited for attempting to intercept slower targets like helicopters and drones.”
…
“Still, the underlying concept behind the 358 missile is very intriguing. If the weapon works as described, they could be launched into forward areas where drones or helicopters are known or expected to travel through, and hunt and kill them without any need for additional advanced offboard sensors. This could be particularly useful for engaging incoming drones, which can be very hard to spot and engage with traditional air defense systems.”
“Beyond all this, groups of 358s flying figure-eight orbits would just present additional hazards an opponent would have to contend with or attempt to plan around, which could be problematic seeing that they can fly out to remote locations. If the 358 is low cost, then it could be even easier to deploy large numbers of them at once to increase the probability of success and otherwise try to disrupt enemy air operations.”
In 2023, the Houthis did unveil a Saqr-2 missile, which lacks the tail fins found on the Saqr-1/358. How else the Saqr-2 differs from its predecessor is not known, but observers have noted that it looks as if it might be slightly shorter overall. A smaller design could allow for more compact launchers and otherwise make the missile easier to handle.
Iran has also now developed a larger and more capable “359” based on the general form and function of the 358 design, which is claimed to have a maximum range of (150 kilometers), be able to reach a top speed of (1,000 kilometers per hour), and be able to get up to an altitude of 30,000 feet. The 359, which is not yet known to be in Houthi service, can reportedly be recovered via parachute and reused if it does not prosecute an intercept. The parachute recovery feature on the 359 could possibly allow for its use in a secondary surveillance and reconnaissance role, as well.
— Clash Report (@clashreport) January 16, 2025Iran unveils the “359” surface-to-air loitering missile.
An upgraded version of the “358,” the “359” features a larger design, likely powered by a Tolou-10 turbojet engine, extending its range to 150 km and altitude to over 9 km.
It reaches speeds of up to 1,000 km/h and… pic.twitter.com/GWUDDgQlam
Repurposed Air-To-Air Missiles
In addition to Iranian-supplied designs, the Houthis have also repurposed a number of Soviet-era and Russian-made air-to-air missiles for use as ground-based anti-air weapons. This includes R-73Es, R-27Ts, and R-77s, which the Houthis refer to in their new surface-to-air configurations as Thaqib-1, Thaqib-2, and Thaqib-3, respectively. Russia originally delivered these missiles to Yemen in the early-to-mid 2000s to go along with MiG-29SMT fighters, a fleet that has become increasingly inoperable, if not outright destroyed, in the past decade or so.
The R-27Ts and R-73Es are both infrared-guided missiles, and target acquisition and cuing are generally understood to be done via improvised infrared sensor systems on the ground. Radars could also be employed to at least help spot targets initially. Infrared sensors are known to be part of the unrelated Gravehawk surface-to-air missile system in use in Ukraine, which also uses repurposed R-73s as its interceptor. Ukrainian forces have a number of other systems in service that also fire R-73s in the surface-to-air mode, including modified 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) air defense vehicles, which have an array of onboard radars, as well as a Humvee-based design and anti-air configured drone boats.
When used in the surface-to-air mode, the R-73 has the immediate benefit of being a weapon with a high-off-boresight (HOBS) engagement capability. This means that it has an articulating seeker with a much wider field of regard than non-HOBS designs, which would aid in locking onto more dynamic targets while loaded onto a fixed launcher on the ground, as well as engaging them after launch.
The seekers on the R-27T and R-73E are also passive. As such, the crew of any aircraft without electro-optical missile approach warning sensors would have to rely on visually spotting the incoming threat before it is too late, something that we’ll come back to toward the end of this story.
The versions of the R-77 that the Houthis appear to have turned into Thaqib-3 surface-to-air missiles look to be typical radar-guided types, which could require a different kind of initial cuing than their R-27 and R-73-based counterparts. Thaqib-1s and 2s have been seen in use by the Houthis loaded on truck-mounted launchers, but there does not appear to be any clear evidence of the Thaqib-3 having entered real service.
